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Abstract
We build a model where two banks compete for the patronage of consumers by of-
fering them, among other services and products, two forms of transactional media:
paper statements and electronic substitutes. Both banks and both products are
horizontally di¤erentiated and modeled à la Hotelling(1929). Assuming symmetry
of consumer preferences (over banks and, independently, over the two transac-
tional media) and of bankss costs, we obtain that the unique prot-maximizing
symmetrical prices reect both the transactional media marginal costs and the
intensity of competition between banks. Most notably, the intensity of consumers
preferences for one variant of transactional medium over another has no inuence
on the prot-maximizing media prices. Also, there is total pass-through of in-
creases in input prices (such as mail price for paper statements) into prices paid
by nal consumers.
1 Introduction
Historically, nancial institutions have been large mail users, as they provided
nancial information and paper statements to their customers. In more recent
times, however, their customers have been o¤ered the choice of alternative services
through the digital medium on-line. The customers of these institutions not only
have a choice of bank, but also a choice in the kind of service they receive within
the transactional market. In recent years we have observed a signicant switching
from transactional mail to the digital alternative. Understanding these market
developments is important for policy makers, as they seek to maintain the nancial
viability of the Universal Service Provider (USP).
In De Donder et al. (2012), we tackle this issue by assuming that the USP
rst sets its prices, including the mail price to be paid by nancial institutions,
and that several banks then play a Cournot game, choosing simultaneously the
quantity of transactional media (both paper statements and electronic substitutes)
that maximizes their prot given the choice of others. No e¤ort was made in that
paper to provide micro-foundations for the demand functions relating prices and
volumes of transactional media that were used by banks.
The objective of this paper is to provide such micro-foundations, in a setting
where both banks and transactional media are horizontally di¤erentiated. Assum-
ing symmetry of consumerstastes for banks and for media, as well as symmetry of
marginal costs across banks, we obtain that the prot-maximizing transactional
media prices of the banks reect their marginal cost, plus a mark-up inversely
linked to the intensity of competition between banks. These prot-maximizing
prices are not a¤ected by the intensity of preferences of consumers for one type
of transactional medium versus another; they are characterized by complete pass-
through of any increase in input costs (such as mail price for paper statements)
on the nal consumer price of the transactional medium.
The next section presents the model. The next three sections solve the model
by backward induction, starting with the choice of transactional medium within
a bank (Section 3), moving to the choice of banks (Section 4) and ending up with
the prot-maximizing media prices (Section 5). The nal section concludes.
2 The model
Consumers choose between two banks (A and B) to satisfy their banking needs.
Banking services can be considered as bundles of goods and services (such as check-
ing and savings accounts, loans and credits, savings products, nancial counseling,
etc.). One of the services provided by banks consists in providing their clients
with information regarding their bank accounts and more generally their nancial
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dealings with the bank. To provide this information, banks can either use paper
statements (good 2) or an electronic substitute (good 1). Since the objective of
this paper is to concentrate on the determinants of the demand for paper state-
ments, we assume from now on that the characteristics of the other goods and
services o¤ered by the two banks are set exogenously and we concentrate on how
banks price paper statements and their electronic substitute.
Both banks and both transactional media within banks are modeled as hor-
izontally di¤erentiated. Following Hotelling (1929)s tradition, we assume that
bank A is located at zero on the X = [0; 1] axis, while bank B is located at one.
These locations are assumed to be exogenous, and to reect some characteristics
of the banks that are left unmodeled here, such as for instance the location of the
banks on Main Street. Likewise, within both banks, paper statements are located
at 1 while the electronic substitute is located at zero on the Z = [0; 1] dimen-
sion. Here also, we take these locations as given, and reecting the exogenous
characteristics of these two transactional media.
There is a continuum of consumers who di¤er according to their intrinsic pref-
erences for banks and for transactional media. We assume for simplicity that
the two dimensions of preferences are orthogonal to each other. Formally, con-
sumers are uniformly and independently distributed on the Z X = [0; 1] [0; 1]
space. The Z dimension measures the preference for the characteristics of the
transactional media, while the X dimension measures preferences for bankschar-
acteristics.
The location x 2 [0; 1] of a consumer represents his preferences for banks
characteristics. An individual located at x incurs a disutility of x (the distance
between his most-preferred variant of the bank and the characteristics of bank A)
times a linear transportation costt when opening an account with bank A, and
a disutility of (1   x) times t when opening an account with bank B. As usual
in the horizontal di¤erentiation models, the linear cost t can be given either a
geographical or a preference interpretation.
Similarly, we assume that the location z 2 [0; 1] of a consumer represents his
preferences for the characteristics of transactional media. That is, an individual
located at z incurs a disutility of z (the distance between his most-preferred variant
of the medium and the characteristic of good 1) times a linear transportation
cost, r, when consuming good 1, and a disutility of (1 z) times r when consuming
good 2. The interpretation of the transportation cost is here exclusively in terms
of preferences. For instance, agents located close to one may not be computer
literate and thus prefer to receive, handle and le paper, while agents closer to
zero may be younger, well-versed in dealing with the Internet, and prefer electronic
handling of statements.
Let qji denote the consumer price of good i (i = 1; 2) in bank j (j = A;B) and
assume that banks set their prices in order to maximize prots. Each consumer
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chooses one bank and one form of transactional medium in that bank.
The timing of the model we consider is that banks rst post (simultaneously)
their prices qji , and that consumers then choose which bank to patronize and which
form of transactional medium to use in that bank. To simplify the presentation,
we assume that consumers rst choose their bank, and then choose their preferred
form of transactional medium. This assumption of a sequential choice leads to
the same (subgame perfect Nash) equilibrium as the simultaneous choice.1
As usual, we solve the game by backward induction, starting with the choice
between goods 1 and 2 for a consumer with an account in bank j.
3 The choice between paper statements and elec-
tronic substitutes
Consumers all obtain a gross utility level of U ji when they consume one unit of
good i in bank j. This corresponds to the utility they would obtain if bank j
had the ideal characteristic of the consumer on the X axis, and if it were o¤ering
the consumers ideal transactional variant of good i on the Z axis. Unfortunately,
the characteristics of both banks and transactional media usually di¤er from con-
sumersideal ones. To obtain the net utility of a consumer located at (x; z), we
subtract the price he has to pay for this unit of medium, and the disutility from
consuming a good whose characteristics are not exactly what he most prefers, in
a bank whose characteristics are in general not optimal for him either. Denoting
by V ji the net utility from buying one unit of good i from bank j, we obtain that
V A1 = U
A
1   qA1   rz   tx;
V A2 = U
A
2   qA2   r(1  z)  tx;
V B1 = U
B
1   qB1   rz   t(1  x);
V B2 = U
B
2   qB2   r(1  z)  t(1  x):
An individual located at (x; z) and with an account in bank j chooses paper
statements (good 2) over the electronic substitute (good 1) if
V j1  V j2
, U j1   qj1   rz  U j2   qj2   r(1  z)
, z  ~zj(qj1; qj2) =
1
2
+
(U j1   qj1)  (U j2   qj2)
2r
: (1)
1The decisions are made by the same agent and no new information is revealed between the
two stages.
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Equation (1) is intuitive. Consumers who are located close enough to 1 in the Z
space (i.e., who prefer an ideal form of transactional medium that is close enough
to the characteristics of paper statements) buy paper statements rather than their
electronic substitutes. The threshold value of z above which consumers buy paper
statements in bank j (denoted by ~zj) decreases when the net utility from buying
this good (U j2   qj2) increases compared to the net utility of buying the other good
(U j1   qj1). The net utility of buying good i in bank j can increase either because
its price qji decreases, or because this good becomes intrinsically more attractive
(U ji increases). As r increases, it becomes more di¢ cult to convince consumers by
changing price levels to consume a variant of the transactional medium di¤erent
from the one closer to their most-preferred option. At the limit, when r tends
toward innity, ~zj is then equal to one half. Also, the preference for bank A vs B
of the client plays no role, once the client has decided which bank to use (since
the same disutility from the bank appears whatever the transactional medium
used in that bank). Finally, with a uniform distribution of consumers on the Z
axis, ~zj (resp., 1   ~zj) also measures the proportion of bank js consumers who
buy the electronic substitute (resp., the paper statements), and the fraction of the
total demand for transactional medium that takes the form of electronic substitute
(resp., paper statements) in bank j.
We now move to the rst stage choice of the bank.
4 The choice of a bank
We denote byW j the net utility of opening an account with bank j and we obtain
WA = V A1 = U
A
1   qA1   rz   tx if z  ~zA(qA1 ; qA2 );
WA = V A2 = U
A
2   qA2   r(1  z)  tx if z > ~zA(qA1 ; qA2 );
WB = V B1 = U
B
1   qB1   rz   t(1  x) if z  ~zB(qB1 ; qB2 );
WB = V B2 = U
B
2   qB2   r(1  z)  t(1  x) if z > ~zB(qB1 ; qB2 ):
Observe that the decision of which bank to choose depends on both x and z. This
is intuitive since both banks may charge di¤erent prices for the same product, so
that intrinsic preferences both for banks and for the type of transactional medium
o¤ered in each bank plays a role when choosing which bank to patronize.
Assume for the moment that ~zA(qA1 ; q
A
2 )  ~zB(qB1 ; qB2 )  i.e., that paper state-
ments are relatively more attractive in bank A than in bank B (the case where
~zA(qA1 ; q
A
2 ) > ~z
B(qB1 ; q
B
2 ) is solved in a similar way). Depending on his preferences
for transactional medium (as given by his location z), a consumer belongs to one
of three groups.
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In the rst group, characterized by z < ~zA(qA1 ; q
A
2 ) < ~z
B(qB1 ; q
B
2 ), a consumer
located at (x; z) knows that he will choose electronic statements (good 1) whatever
the bank he joins. He chooses bank A if
WA  WB , V A1  V B1
, UA1   qA1   rz   tx  UB1   qB1   rz   t(1  x)
, x  ~x1(qA1 ; qB1 ) =
1
2
+
(UA1   qA1 )  (UB1   qB1 )
2t
: (2)
The preference for paper vs electronic statements (the value of z) plays no role
in the choice of banks once it is understood that the consumer would choose the
same medium in both banks. The interpretation of (2) is similar to (1): agents
whose preferences are close enough to zero on the X dimension (i.e., who care
more for the intrinsic characteristics of bank A than of bank B) patronize bank
A. This is the case for agents whose most-preferred value of x is lower than the
threshold ~x1, where the subscript 1 is used to indicate that the consumer would
buy good 1 in both banks. This threshold depends only on the prices and gross
utility of good 1 in both banks. A larger value of t (the utility cost of moving
away from your most-preferred banks characteristics) means that less importance
is given to the characteristics of the paper statements chosen in both banks.
Similarly, in the second group, where ~zA(qA1 ; q
A
2 ) < ~z
B(qB1 ; q
B
2 ) < z, the con-
sumer located at (x; z) knows that he will choose the paper statements (good 2)
whatever the bank he joins. He chooses bank A if
WA  WB , V A2  V B2
, UA2   qA2   r(1  z)  tx  UB2   qB2   r(1  z)  t(1  x)
, x  ~x2(qA2 ; qB2 ) =
1
2
+
(UA2   qA2 )  (UB2   qB2 )
2t
: (3)
We index the threshold value of x below which consumers choose bank A by 2
since the consumer would buy good 2 in both banks. This threshold depends only
on net utility provided by paper statements in both banks, and the intensity of
preferences for banks (as measured by the cost t).
In the third group, dened by ~zA(qA1 ; q
A
2 ) < z < ~z
B(qB1 ; q
B
2 ), a consumer located
at (x; z) knows that he will choose electronic statements (good 1) if he joins bank
B and paper statements (good 2) if he joins bank A. He chooses bank A if
WA  WB , V A2  V B1
, UA2   qA2   r(1  z)  tx  UB1   qB1   r   t(1  x)
, x  ~x21(qA1 ; qB1 ; z) =
1
2
+
(UA2   qA2 )  (UB1   qB1 )  r + 2rz
2t
(4)
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We index the threshold value of x below which consumers choose bank A by 21
since the consumer would buy good 2 in bank A and good 1 in bank B. The
choice of bank now depends on the di¤erence in the net utility provided by paper
statements in bank A and electronic substitutes in bank B. It also depends on
both the preference of the individual for digital medium (measured by z) and
the intensity of this preference (as measured by r). An individual with a larger
value of z cares more for paper statements, which will be chosen only if the agent
patronizes bank A. A larger value of z then increases the threshold ~x21 below
which agents choose bank A, at a rate equal to the ratio of the transport costs,
r=t. Observe that ~x21 increases (resp., decreases) with r if z > 1=2 (resp., if
z < 1=2). When a consumers most-preferred variant of transactional medium is
closer to paper statements than to electronic substitutes (z > 1=2), a larger value
of r means that he puts more emphasis on this dimension of choice, where bank A
dominates bank B. This in turn increases the attractiveness of bank A compared
to B, which results in an increase in the threshold ~x21 below which agents choose
bank A.
Observe that
~x21(q
A
1 ; q
B
1 ; ~z
A(qA1 ; q
A
2 )) = ~x1(q
A
1 ; q
B
1 );
~x21(q
A
1 ; q
B
1 ; ~z
B(qB1 ; q
B
2 )) = ~x2(q
A
2 ; q
B
2 );
and that ~x2(qA2 ; q
B
2 ) > ~x1(q
A
1 ; q
B
1 ) so that the threshold value of x below which
consumers choose bank A is a continuous function of z, even when consumers
switch from one of the three afore mentioned groups to another.
We represent the demand for both goods in both banks in the following Figure.
Insert Figure 1 around here.
Consumers with low values of both x and z patronize bank A where they
choose electronic media, while consumers with large values of both x and z choose
bank B and opt for paper statements there. The rest of the Z  X space is
divided in two. People with low values of z and large values of x prefer electronic
medium in bank B, while agents with large values of z and small values of x prefer
paper statements in bank A. Since we have assumed that ~zA < ~zB, consumers
with intermediate values of z prefer either electronic medium in bank B or paper
statements in bank A, as is shown on Figure 1.
From Figure 1, together with the uniform distribution of the unitary mass of
consumers over ZX, we obtain the expressions for the demand functions, where
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Y ji represents the total demand for good i in bank j:
2
Y A1 (q
A
1 ; q
A
2 ; q
B
1 ; q
B
2 ) = ~z
A(qA1 ; q
A
2 )~x1(q
A
1 ; q
B
1 );
Y B1 (q
A
1 ; q
A
2 ; q
B
1 ; q
B
2 ) = ~z
A(qA1 ; q
A
2 )(1  ~x1(qA1 ; qB1 )) +
~zB(qB1 ;q
B
2 )Z
~zA(qA1 ;q
A
2 )
(1  ~x21(qA2 ; qB1 ))dz;
Y A2 (q
A
1 ; q
A
2 ; q
B
1 ; q
B
2 ) = (1  ~zB(qB1 ; qB2 ))~x2(qA2 ; qB2 ) +
~zB(qB1 ;q
B
2 )Z
~zA(qA1 ;q
A
2 )
~x21(q
A
2 ; q
B
1 )dz;
Y B2 (q
A
1 ; q
A
2 ; q
B
1 ; q
B
2 ) = (1  ~zB(qB1 ; qB2 ))(1  ~x2(qA2 ; qB2 )):
We now move to the rst stage of the model, namely the prot-maximizing
behavior of the two banks.
5 Equilibrium transactional media prices
For each good i, bank j faces a marginal cost cji ; xed costs, if any, do not a¤ect
prot maximizing prices (as long as prots are positive). The prot function of
bank j is given by
j = (qj1   cj1)Y j1 (qA1 ; qA2 ; qB1 ; qB2 ) + (qj2   cj1   p  kj)Y j2 (qA1 ; qA2 ; qB1 ; qB2 ):
Each bank maximizes its prot by choosing its prices qj1 and q
j
2 while taking the
prices of the other bank as given (Nash equilibrium).
We concentrate on the case where the banks are totally symmetrical in costs
(cAi = c
B
i = ci) and in the two transactional products that they o¤er (U
A
i =
UBi = Ui). On the other hand, the two goods are not symmetrical, because they
may di¤er in marginal cost (c2 6= c1) and also in the willingness to pay for them
(U1 6= U2). We look for a symmetrical equilibrium, where the prices posted by the
banks are the same (qAi = q
B
i ; i = 1; 2) so that the marginal consumer indi¤erent
between banks is located at x = 1=2.
We obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 There is a unique symmetrical prot-maximizing equilibrium, which
is such that
qAi = q
B
i = q

i = ci + t:
2There is an analogue to Figure 1 where ~zB < ~zA when prices and preferences are such that
paper is relatively more attractive (compared to its electronic substitute) in bank B than in
bank A.
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Proof : See Appendix.
In both banks and for both transactional media, the prot-maximizing sym-
metrical price is given by the sum of marginal cost and of the transportation cost
between banks. This transportation cost reects the intensity of competition be-
tween banks. If t = 0, banks are seen as perfectly interchangeable by consumers
who all patronize the cheapest one. It is then no surprise to obtain marginal cost
pricing in that case. As t increases, the intensity of competition between banks
decreases, which leaves more room to increase the transactional media prices.
Observe that r, the intensity of preferences for one type a transactional medium
rather than another, plays no role in the formula of the prot-maximizing media
prices. Even if r is large, banks cannot use this lower sensitivity of the choice
of media to their prices to increase these prices, because banks have rst and
foremost to attract consumers if they want to charge them for transactional media.
In other words, how much consumers care for one form of transactional medium
versus another has no impact on their prices, which are set by the banks according
to the marginal cost of each of these media and intensity of competition between
them, the latter as measured in this model by the parameter t.
Observe also that Ui, the gross utility obtained from consuming transactional
medium i, does not inuence the optimal consumer prices by the banks, for the
same reason that r does not inuence them either. On the other hand, the equi-
librium volume of good i is increasing in Ui, since more consumers buy good i
when Ui increases, other things remaining equal.
We now make more explicit the link between transactional media costs, mail
price and prot-maximizing prices by banks. Assume that c1 reects the mar-
ginal cost of processing one consumers information in either bank, and that the
marginal cost of making this information available to the consumer by electronic
means is zero. Assume as well that this marginal processing costs has also to be
borne by a bank in the case of paper statements. In that case, the bank has also
to support a marginal mail preparation cost of k and has to pay the mail price p
for each consumer opting for paper statements. In other words, we assume that
c2 = c1 + k + p:
We then obtain that paper statements should be more expensive than electronic
media (since their marginal cost is higher), which results in our model in lower
volumes for paper statements than for electronic substitutes. The di¤erence in
the prices of the two transactional media should exactly reect the di¤erence in
costs. Also, observe that we have complete pass through of any mail price increase
into the nal price paid by consumers for mail statements. These observations
remain true whatever the intensity of competition between banks. They of course
rely heavily on the symmetry assumptions (including the uniform distribution of
consumers preferences over both X and Z) made in the paper.
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6 Conclusion
We have built a model where two banks compete for the patronage of consumers
by o¤ering them, among other services and products, two forms of transactional
media: paper statements and electronic substitutes. Both banks and both prod-
ucts are horizontally di¤erentiated and modeled à la Hotelling (1929). Assum-
ing symmetry of consumer preferences (over banks and, independently, over the
two transactional media) and of bankss costs, we obtain that the unique prot-
maximizing symmetrical prices reect both the transactional media marginal costs
and the intensity of competition between banks. Most notably, the intensity of
consumers preferences for one variant of transactional medium over another has no
inuence on the prot-maximizing media prices. Also, there is total pass-through
of increases in input prices (such as mail price for paper statements) into prices
paid by nal consumers.
These results are obtained under the strong assumptions of symmetry in con-
sumers preferences (both for banks and for transactional media) and in banks
marginal costs. Bringing this model to empirical studies would then rst require
to extend our results to non symmetrical environments. We leave this extension
for future research.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
The rst-order condition for qA1 is given by
@A
@qA1
=
(qA1   c1)((UB1   qB1 )  (UA1   qA1 )  t) + (qA2   c2)((UA1   qA1 )  (UB1   qA1 ) + t)
4rt
+
(qA1   c1)((UA2   qA2 )  (UA1   qA1 )  r)
4rt
+
((UA1   qA1 )  (UB1   qB1 ) + t)((UA1   qA1 )  (UA2   qA2 ) + r)
4rt
= 0:
The rst-order condition for qB2 is given by
@B
@qB2
=
(qB2   c2)((UB1   qB1 )  (UB2   qB2 )  r) + (qB1   c1)((UB2   qB2 )  (UA2   qA2 ) + t)
4rt
+
(qB2   c2)((UA2   qA2 )  (UB2   qB2 )  t)
4rt
+
((UB2   qB2 )  (UB1   qB1 ) + r)((UB2   qB2 )  (UA2   qA2 ) + t)
4rt
= 0:
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When measured at the symmetrical equilibrium (qA1 = q
B
1 = q1; q
A
2 = q
B
2 = q2),
and using the assumptions that UAi = U
B
i = Ui and that c
A
i = c
B
i = ci (i = 1; 2),
these two FOCs simplify to3
@A
@qA1
=
(q1)
2 + t(U1   U2   c2   2q2 + r)
4rt
c1(U1   U2   q1 + q2 + r + t)(U1   U2 + q2 + r + 2t)
4rt
= 0;
@B
@qB2
=
(q1   c1)t+ (q2   c2)((U1   q1)  (U2   q2)  r   t)
4rt
 t((U1   q1)  (U2   q2)  r)
4rt
= 0:
Solving these two FOCs simultaneously gives the unique symmetrical equilibrium
q1 = c1 + t;
q2 = c2 + t:
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